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The Surprisingly Constant Cost 
   of Landmine Impact Surveys 
by Russell Gasser [ Humanitarian Technology Consulting Ltd. ]
Landmine Impact Surveys involve survey teams that work with the local people to evaluate how land-
mines and unexploded ordnance affect daily lives. The Survey Action Center, United Nations and the 
affected countries closely regulate this process to ensure the preservation of high standards.1 
There is no obvious reason that a Landmine Im-pact Survey should cost the same in a small European country like Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na as it does in Chad or Thailand, but analysis of the 13 
surveys with published costs shows that most surveys 
do cost about the same amount.1 The two largest surveys 
(Afghanistan and Angola) show more variation. This 
analysis provides a way to deduce which of the past sur-
veys were most cost-effective and could lead to ways of 
reducing LIS costs, while providing estimates for future 
survey costs. Several surveys have been stopped and re-
started due to funding shortfalls; therefore, a better cost 
estimate would help in planning. It is important to re-
member this is not a rigorously predictive method but 
an observation on worldwide experience. 
Surveys are conducted as defined by international 
protocols.2 This method probably accounts for the fairly 
constant fixed costs, which are more than US$900,000 
Locals from landmine-affected communities draw community maps in Sudan.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
per country (See Figure 1 next page). 
In addition to these fixed costs, a 
variable component averages about 
$800 for each community suspected 
of being affected by landmines and/
or unexploded ordnance from the 
start of the main data collection.
Before the main survey starts, 
an LIS undertakes a Recollection 
of the Opinion of Experts in the af-
fected country that results in a list 
of each community in which peo-
ple are considered mine- and/or 
UXO-affected. These communi-
ties are known as suspected posi-
tives. At this point in the process, 
identifying potentially affected 
communities may eliminate areas 
within the country where there has 
been no conflict. In Senegal, only 
the southern province of Casa-
mance has mined areas. In Thai-
land, mines only exist in certain 
border areas. Thus far, every sur-
vey has found that a significant 
proportion—roughly one-half—
of the suspected positives are not 








Afghanistan 2005 3,004,494 4,655 2,365
Angola 2007 6,778,163 4,384 1,988
Armenia 2005 669,800 99 60
Azerbaijan 2003 1,236,000 610 480
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 2,006,730 2,939 1,366
Cambodia 2002 1,360,000 13,908 2,776 No sampling
Chad 2001 1,842,000 1,361 249
Eritrea 2004 2,291,992 352 132
Ethiopia 2004 4,029,672 3,281 1,492
Iraq 2006 No Data 12,010 2,117 No sampling
Kosovo 2000 111,000 No Data No Data
Lebanon 2003 1,500,000 1,065 306
Mauritania 2006 No Data No Data No Data
Mozambique 2001 2,272,000 2,057 791
Senegal No Data No Data No Data No Data
Somalia (all three phases) 2007 1,906,900 496 482
Sudan 2009 No Data Not aggregated 296
Thailand 2001 1,656,000 1,491 530
Yemen 2000 1,645,000 1,294 592
Table 1: Landmine Impact Survey data available from reports found on  
http://www.sac-na.org.
mine- and/or UXO-affected, and 
they then become false positives in 
the survey data. (See Table 1.)
The correlation of total cost 
against parameters—such as the 
number of communities suspect-
ed, the number visited, the number 
impacted, the number with mines, 
UXO or victims, plus several differ-
ent combinations of this data—was 
analyzed for all available published 
surveys. This assessment showed that 
the best correlation is between the 
overall cost and the number of sus-
pected positives after the initial data 
gathering and gazetteer preparation. 
This result may be expected, as a sur-
vey team usually must visit each sus-
pected positive community.
The correlation strength between 
costs and suspected positives was 
unexpected at the beginning of the 
analysis. After eliminating the coun-
tries with missing data—including 
Cambodia, which did not use a sam-
pling methodology—a strong corre-
lation of 0.8 for all surveys was found 
to exist between the costs and sus-
pected positives. (See Figure 1) The 
fixed costs are surprisingly high, 
meaning that the larger the survey, 
the lower the cost per affected com-
munity. Although this varies from 
one country to another, Afghani-
stan and Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na were less costly than average, 
whereas Angola, Eritrea, and So-
malia were more expensive.3 These 
increased costs may be explained 
because the Angola LIS had to be 
stopped and restarted, and Soma-
lia’s survey was undertaken in three 
phases.1
Future Outcomes
I suggest the mine-action com-
munity can draw some useful con-
clusions from this analysis:
1. The set of protocols closely regu-
lating the LIS probably contrib-
utes to the relatively constant 
cost. To improve efficiency and 
cut costs, either the protocols 
will need revision or future sur-
veys will need to reduce the im-
plementation of only the most 
essential protocol elements. This 
situation poses a dilemma: Re-
working the protocols is likely to 
be slow and expensive, but sur-
veys not in compliance are less 
likely to receive funding.
2. First estimates of the overall 
cost of any future surveys can 
be made. The number of surveys 
that have run out of money sug-
gest this exercise could be use-
ful. A better measurement of the 
likely cost-benefit before invest-
ing millions of dollars in a sur-
vey will result. 
3. As cost is related to the num-
ber of suspected positives and 
about half of these are found to 
be false positives, it seems that 
1
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Figure 1: Landmine Impact Survey costs available from re-
ports found on http://www.sac-na.org.
spending more time and effort 
on the initial data collection 
could be useful. If the number 
of false positives can be reduced, 
it is reasonable to assume that 
overall costs will also decrease. 
The Expert Opinion Collection 
is usually a relatively small part 
of the overall survey cost, so in-
vesting more resources on ac-
curately collecting data early in 
the process may be a useful ap-
proach to improving the LIS 
cost-benefit ratio.
Conclusion
The initial data collection in an 
LIS designates communities as po-
tentially impacted by mines and 
UXO. Distinguishing between sus-
pected positives and false positives 
early in the process can reduce the 
costs of the LIS. Based on analysis 
of the correlation between costs and 
suspected positives, evidence sup-
ports that efficient planning can re-
duce future survey expenses.
Given the small number of coun-
tries that still require an LIS, the 
outcome of this analysis can give 
better cost estimates to potential do-
nors and identify the survey parts 
where savings are most probable 
in the future. At this stage, with so 
many Landmine Impact Surveys 
completed worldwide, rewriting the 
protocols is likely not useful. Fo-
cusing on more efficient implemen-
tation and collecting core data in 
different countries is a better route 
to cost savings overall. 
see endnotes page 83
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The Rise in Terrorist Attacks  
   in the Western Sahara
by Lt. Colonel Mohamed Taghioullah Ould Nema [ Cabinet of the Mauritanian National Army ]
The Mauritanian government is taking steps to prevent Al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts, including suicide 
bombings and kidnappings in the region. Added to this threat are the explosives Al-Qaeda is able to ob-
tain from landmines and unexploded ordnance scattered throughout the region after years of conflict in 
Western Sahara. The United Nations Development Programme and various countries work to remove 
these landmines and items of UXO, which is complicated by the lack of a Landmine Impact Survey.
In 2009, while driving toward the French embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, I suddenly encoun-
tered a large blast. As I approached 
the scene, I saw the worst sight I have 
ever seen—the results of a suicide 
bombing explosion. A 20-year-old 
man had blown himself up trying to 
kill two innocent embassy staff mem-
bers while they were exercising. The 
explosion split the man’s corpse into 
three parts: His head to stomach was 
dismembered and lying in the center 
of the path; his lower part was thrown 
about 12 meters (13 yards) away; and 
pieces of his legs and other small bits 
were strewn about on the pavement. 
He committed this action during the 
daytime, in front of everyone, and I 
saw it myself.
Immediately following the attack, 
fear paralyzed the people nearby. No 
one wanted to move because they 
were shocked and revolted by the ex-
plosion, and they were worried about 
additional attacks.
Al-Qaeda’s Terrorism in Mauritania
This was the first suicide bomb-
ing in the country and the beginning 
of many Al-Qaeda el Maghreb Islámi 
(Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb) 
attacks in Mauritania. For example, 
the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott 
was blown up by a grenade and as-
saulted by terrorist fighters, wound-
ing three people. Three French 
tourists were killed at Aleg (in the 
deep country). Finally, AQIM killed 
French captive Michel Germaneau 
in retaliation for a French raid that 
killed six AQIM militants.1 AQIM 
had kidnapped Michel Germaneau 
in Niger on the border with Mali and 
Algeria, but where he was killed re-
mains unknown.1,2
The Mauritanian government is 
determined to fight terrorists. Many 
specialized units in counterterror-
ism are stationed on the borders be-
tween Algeria, Mauritania and Mali. 
The soldiers comprising these units 
were highly trained in counterter-
rorism techniques by American 
and French experts. In addition, the 
Mauritanian government essentially 
provided all the needed equipment 
to the units (e.g., helicopters, vehi-
cles, radar, an armored personnel 
carrier, night-vision goggles, etc.).
Using technology and satellite 
data, Mauritania’s counterterror-
ism team is gathering accurate in-
telligence extending beyond the 
country’s borders to stop the extrem-
ists before they can launch new at-
tacks. A joint tactical-operational 
center was created in Algeria. This 
center provides updated intelligence 
information, assesses the security 
situation and coordinates shared ac-
tions against AQIM.
Other bandits, arms traffick-
ers and drug dealers are located in 
the same region as the AQIM fight-
ers and can collaborate with them 
in terms of resupply or equipment 
support, although AQIM mem-
A sentry guards the approach 
road to a lightly guarded Maurita-
nian Army munitions supply point.
All photos courtesy of John Stevens, 
PM/WRA, U.S. Department of State.
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